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A widely held belief in the United States and the world financial com- 
munity is that the default of  major debtors-whether  companies or 
municipalities or sovereign countries-could lead to bank failures that 
would precipitate a financial crisis.  The remedy  proposed by  those 
propagating this view is that major debtors therefore must be rescued 
from the threat of bankruptcy to avert the projected dire consequences 
for banks and for the stability of the financial system. I shall argue that 
(a) a debtor whose affairs have been mismanaged should be liquidated 
or reorganized under new management; (b) default by major debtors 
need not result in bank failures; (c) if defaults do result in bank failures, 
so long as the security of the private sector’s deposits is assured, no 
financial crisis will ensue. The bugaboo of  financial crisis has been 
created to divert attention from  the true remedies  that  the present 
financial situation demands. 
A financial crisis is fuelled by fears that means of payment will be 
unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional-reserve banking system, 
leads to a scramble for high-powered money. It is precipitated by ac- 
tions of the public that suddenly squeeze the reserves of the banking 
system. In afutile attempt to restore reserves, the banks may call loans, 
refuse to roll over existing loans, or resort to selling assets. Such a 
sequence of events is to be distinguished from what happens during a 
disinflation or a deflation. A deflation or a disinflation is a consequence 
of restricted growth of bank reserves but it is not precipitated by the 
public’s behavior. The essence of a financial crisis is that it is shortlived, 
ending with a slackening of the public’s demand for additional currency. 
A disinflation or a deflation may be long drawn out. Nominal wealth 
may decline, real debts may rise, but these are not financial crises.’ 
No financial crisis has occurred in the United States since 1933, and 
none has occurred in the United Kingdom since 1866. All the phenom- 
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ena of recent years that have been characterised as financial crisis-a 
decline in asset prices of equity stocks, real estate, commodities; de- 
preciation of the exchange value of a national currency; financial dis- 
tress of a large non-financial firm, a large municipality, a financial in- 
dustry, or sovereign debtors-are  pseudo-financial crises.* 
A  real financial crisis occurs only when institutions  do not  exist, 
when authorities are unschooled in the practices that preclude such a 
development,  and when  the private sector has reason to doubt the 
dependability of preventive arrangements. Institutional changes intro- 
duced  since 1933 in the United States and since 1866 in the United 
Kingdom and the private sector’s familiarity with and confidence in 
the responses of institutions and authorities assure that concern with 
financial crises is misplaced. What should be the object of concern with 
respect  to the proposals to deal with pseudo-financial crises  is the 
perpetuation of policies that promote inflation and waste of economic 
resources. 
Section 11.1 reviews the last real financial crisis in England and notes 
developments at later dates when a financial crisis did not occur in 
England but did in the United States. Section 11.2 tries to account for 
the record in the two countries. Section 11.3 examines the link that 
Kindleberger (1978) attempts to establish between manias and financial 
crises from 1720 to 1975. Finally, section 11.4 questions the emphasis 
currently given to financial distress as the trigger for financial crises 
and shows that it is based on a misinterpretation  of the development 
of past real financial crises. It is not financial distress that triggers a 
crisis.  The failure of  authorities or institutions to respond in a pre- 
dictable way to ward off  a crisis and the private sector’s uncertainty 
about the response are the triggers of a real financial crisis. 
11.1  England’s Last Real Financial Crisis in 1866 and Later Dates 
When None Occurred There But Did Occur 
in the United States 
I begin by reviewing the circumstances that led to a financial crisis 
in England in 1866 and then turn to developments in 1873, 1890, 1907, 
1914, and 1931-dates when real financial crises might have but did not 
occur in England. I also refer to the experience of the United States 
at these dates leaving for the next section reference to its experience 
in  1884, when a financial crisis was averted and in 1893, when it was 
not. In that section, I try to show why the record changed after 1866 
in England, and why it was variable in the United States. 
11.1.1  1866 
The onset of the financial crisis in 1866 may be traced to the collapse 
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two other companies, the Contract Corporation and the Joint Stock 
Discount Company, with which the first had ties. These three drew on 
paper issued to one another and discounted with Overend, Gurney & 
Company, among others. Overend, Gurney in earlier years had been 
a solid conservative partnership, one of the pillars of the City. About 
1860, a younger generation then in charge of the business became less 
circumspect in its lending operations,  accepting equity interests for 
unrepayable loans  extended  to ironworks and  shipping companies. 
Losses led to a decision to incorporate with the possibility of  turning 
over a new leaf. The new company was launched in 1865 just after the 
conclusion of the US Civil War, when there was every reason to an- 
ticipate a strong revival of demand for British exports, but the new 
company did not live long enough to benefit from it. The failures noted 
above in January 1866 were followed by additional ones in March and 
April, but again those were firms of  marginal significance. However, 
when on 10 May Overend, Gurney shut down, the market was shaken. 
The next day panic broke loose. 
11.1.2  1873 
Twice during the year financial crises were said to have occurred but 
only the second time was the characterization accurate. The first oc- 
casion, centred on the Continent, began on 9 May with a sharp decline 
in prices on the Vienna Stock Exchange. The price decline spread to 
Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, affecting assets like real estate, build- 
ing, railways, and iron and steel ventures that had been in great favour. 
Contraction and liquidation followed but no disruption of  payments. 
In England, the only reflection of  events abroad was a series of  in- 
creases in the Bank rate over a four-week period, followed by stepwise 
reductions over the succeeding ten weeks. 
The real financial crisis, centred on the United  States, had its be- 
ginnings on 8 September when the New York Warehouse & Security 
Company,  organized  to lend  on grain and produce but  involved  in 
railway loans, failed.  Five days later,  Kenyon,  Cox & Company, a 
stock brokerage firm that had endorsed the paper of another railroad, 
also failed. A depressed railroad bond market had led these railroads 
to obtain temporary financing; with the loans about to fall due, neither 
the lenders nor borrowers were prepared to pay up. The failures were 
marginal firms, but on  18  and  19  September two leading firms were 
suspended, Jay Cooke & Company (failure followed the suspension) 
and Fisk & Hatch (resumed but failed in 1884). At the same time runs 
began on two small banks, and on 20 September, on a larger New York 
bank. Panic selling on the New York Stock Exchange led to the closing 
of the market for ten days. Currency went to a premium as the New 
York and interior banks restricted payment in greenbacks. By 22 Oc- 
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Gold was exported  to the United  States on 25  September by the 
Bank of England, exports from other central banks as well continuing 
until the end of October. Bank rate rose. Since investors in England 
and Germany were holders of American securities, the stock market 
crash in New York had reverberations. A sharp sell-off on the London 
Stock Exchange on 6 November led to a rise in Bank rate to 9 per cent 
the next day, but the payment system was not impaired. 
11.1.3  1890 
Two monetary disturbances occurred, one in New York, the other 
in London. Prices on the New York Stock Exchange in November had 
been falling, partly due to selling by English investors, in order “to 
carry the load of investments of a less desirable description” (Sprague 
1910, p. 132) in South America. On 11 November, the failure of Decker, 
Howell  & Company  was  announced, involving the  Bank  of  North 
America. The next day a stock brokerage firm failed and another bank 
closed. On 15 November, the failure of Baring Brothers in London was 
cabled to New York and stock prices fell. The following week several 
firms failed but panic did not develop. 
In England, the imminence of failure by Baring Brothers, owing to 
imprudent investments in the Argentine, became known to the Bank 
of England on 8 November. In addition to underwriting South American 
securities, Barings had a large short-term banking business and con- 
siderable liabilities on deposit account. The actions undertaken by the 
Bank of England and a syndicate of bankers, to be discussed in the 
following section, prevented a crisis. 
11.1.4  1907 
London  was  exposed to a  series of  disturbances from  abroad in 
October, beginning with  a  stock market  decline in  New York.  The 
London and Amsterdam stock markets registered sympathetic declines 
in the prices of American railway securities, but the main disturbance 
began during the week of 14 October when five banks that were mem- 
bers of the New York Clearing House and three outside banks required 
assistance from a group of Clearing House banks. These eight banks 
were controlled through stock ownership on margin by a few men of 
no great financial standing, who used the banks to further speculation 
in the stocks of copper-mining companies.  A decline in the price of 
those stocks alarmed depositors who started runs. Order seemed to 
have been restored by Monday 21 October, when the Knickerbocker 
Trust Company, the third largest trust company in New York, began 
to experience unfavourable clearing balances because the president had 
connections with one of the men in control of the banks that were in 
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a run on Knickerbocker forced it to suspend business. The next day, 
a run began on the second largest trust company, and the day following 
on  still another trust  company. Assistance was given  to these two 
companies, but by that time alarm had spread to the rest of the country. 
Restriction of  payments by the banks followed and currency went to 
a premium over deposits. 
Despite the repercussions from abroad, no financial crisis developed 
in London. Three increases in Bank rate from 3  1 October to 7 Novem- 
ber sufficed to replenish gold exported to New York during the crisis 
there. No bank failures occurred, although voluntary company liqui- 
dations were abnormally high in 1908, presumably because of the level 
interest rates reached in  1908 (Clapham 1945, 11,  p. 393). 
11.1.5  1914 
The problems that arose with heightened war fears in Europe were 
not dissimilar to those that characterised earlier peacetime episodes of 
threats to the dependability of  the credit and payments system. What 
was different was the range of  financial markets-long-term  capital, 
short-term credit, foreign exchange, and gold markets-affected  in both 
England and the United States. 
In the summer of  1914, New York, as usual, was in debt to London 
on short-term account, dependent for its supply of  sterling exchange 
on the proceeds of commercial bills accepted in  London and bought 
on a daily basis by  the London discount market. The disruption of 
remittances from European clients of English accepting houses to cover 
maturing bills led, on  27 July, to a cessation in London of discounting 
of  foreign bills. At  the same time, heavy liquidation of  foreign-held 
securities was in process on the London and New York stock markets, 
the proceeds of  sales in New York, on London’s instructions, to be 
remitted abroad. New  York  banks without sterling exchange could 
remit only in gold, draining reserves. Moreover, the New York banks 
could not count on the proceeds of  the sales to provide bank accom- 
modation for domestic purchasers of  the securities. For the London 
clearing banks, their main liquid assets-bills,  loans to the bill market, 
and loans to the Stock Exchange-ceased  to be liquid. Both London 
and New York closed the stock markets on 31 July. A countrywide 
panic both in England and the United States threatened.3 
11.1.6  1931 
Britain’s abandonment of  the gold standard on 20 September has 
been described as a crisis, as have all the subsequent devaluations of 
the pound and more recently of the dollar. The overvaluation  of sterling 
reflected in weakness in the current account in fact was corrected by 
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noted (1982, pp.  181-2),  the many repercussions of Britain’s suspen- 
sion of convertibility included the decision of others to follow in her 
wake; elsewhere the imposition of exchange controls, tariffs, and trade 
controls; a traditional tightening of monetary policy in the United States 
in response to an external drain of  gold followed by a massive wave 
of bank failures; and further deflation not only in the United States but 
in all countries that remained on gold. The so-called crisis does not 
refer to the situation in other countries. Indeed, there was no crisis 
internally, except for Bank of  England, Treasury, and other officials 
involved in negotiating credits for the Bank before the event and sched- 
uling meetings on what to do next as reserves dwindled. As the text 
of the press notice announcing the decision stated, “There will be no 
interruption of ordinary banking business. The banks will be open as 
usual for the convenience of their customers; and there is no reason 
why sterling transactions should be affected in any way” (Sayers 1976, 
264). Schumpeter commented, “[Iln England there was neither panic 
nor-precisely  owing to the way in which the thing had been done or, 
if the reader prefer, had come about-loss  of ‘confidence,’ but rather 
a sigh of relief” (Schumpeter 1939, 956). 
11.2  When Did a Real Financial Crisis Occur? 
I begin the answer to the question by citing Bagehot’s analysis with 
respect to 1866, the last real financial crisis in England (Bagehot 1873, 
repr.  1902, pp. 64-5): 
And though the Bank of England certainly do make great advances 
in time of panic, yet as they do not do so on any distinct principle, 
they naturally do it hesitatingly, reluctantly, and with misgiving. In 
1847, even in  1866-the  latest panic, and the one in which on the 
whole the Bank acted the best-there  was nevertheless an instant 
when it was believed the Bank would not advance on Consols, or at 
least hesitated to advance on them. The moment this was reported 
in the City and telegraphed to the country, it made the panic indef- 
initely worse. In fact, to make large advances in this faltering way 
is to incur the evil of making them without obtaining the advantage. 
What is wanted and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse 
the impression, that though money may be dear, still money is to be 
had. If people could be really convinced that they could have money 
if  they wait a day or two, and that utter ruin is not coming, most 
likely they would cease to run in such a mad way for money. Either 
shut the Bank at once, and say it will not lend more than it commonly 
lends, or lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you 
mean to go on lending. To  lend a great deal, and yet not give the 
public confidence that you will lend sufficiently and effectually, is 
the worst of all policies; but it is the policy now pursued. 277  Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises 
Bagehot thus stressed the importance of predictable action by the 
monetary authority to prevent a panic; failing that, a bank holiday was 
the course to follow. In 1866, the Bank’s actions were hesitant so the 
public was not convinced that there was no reason to panic.  H. H. 
Gibbs, Governor of the Bank,  1875-7,  referred to the  1866 crisis as 
“its only real blunder in his experience,” because, instead of lending 
freely at an appropriately high rate, as Bagehot advised, “it erred in 
lending at too low a rate before the crisis turned into panic” (Presnell 
1968, p. 188). Although in 1873, when Bagehot wrote he still regarded 
the Bank’s behavior in 1866 as undependable, Gibbs did not blame the 
then Governor since “the matter was not as well understood as it is 
now,” noting that the Bank had done the right thing in 1873, when the 
underlying situation was just as troublesome as in 1866.4 
The United States, by contrast, experienced a real financial crisis in 
1873 because no institutional framework was immediately available to 
deal with the surge of  demand for high-powered money by the public 
and banks.  Belatedly,  the crisis was alleviated  by the issue against 
collateral of clearing-house loan certificates for use in the settlement 
of clearing balances and by US Treasury redemption with greenbacks 
of outstanding government debt.5 
During the next two decades both England and the United States 
were  spared the experience of financial crisis in circumstances  that 
might have been breeding grounds for it. The impact of the failure of 
the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 was sufficiently great to suggest to 
some observers that suspension of the Act of 1844 was required (Pres- 
nell, 1968, p.  189), but it was not.6 
In May 1884, the failure of a Wall Street brokerage firm involving a 
bank whose president was a partner in the brokerage firm was followed 
by the suspension of several other banks. However, a phenomenal rise 
in money market rates brought in an inflow of foreign capital and the 
supply of  funds was further expanded  by prompt issue of  clearing- 
house loan certificates. The suspended banks were thereby enabled to 
resume. Sprague commented (1910, pp.  113-15): 
It will be seen that the steps taken to allay alarm were immediate 
and effective. . . . The success which crowned the efforts of  the 
banks in dealing with the crisis affords convincing evidence that if 
clearing-house loan certificates are to be issued at all, they should 
be issued at the beginning of a disturbance. Local runs on the banks 
did not become severe, because announcement was made that as- 
sistance would be granted at the moment when the disasters which 
might have weakened general confidence became known to the public.’ 
The final episode of the two decades under  consideration,  when 
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was  occasioned by  the troubles  of  Baring Brothers in  1890.  In the 
United States, Sprague noted (1910, p.  142) that it was “the prompt 
action taken by the clearing-house authorities,”  by issuing loan certif- 
icates to meet the needs of particular banks experiencing runs, that 
prevented “the spread of panic.”  Sprague summarised (p. 144)  “one 
of two specifics for the proper treatment of a panic-the  continuance 
of loans to solvent borrowers. A second equally important specific is 
the prompt payment by the banks of every demand by depositors for 
cash.”  In England, the principal device the Bank of England adopted 
to prevent a crisis-it  also borrowed gold from France and bought it 
from Russia-was  to advance sums to meet Barings’ immediate ma- 
turing liabilities, with the guarantee of a syndicate of bankers to make 
good any loss sustained by  the Bank in liquidiating Barings over a 
period of years.* No loss was sustained by the Bank and no call on the 
guarantors was needed.  Presnell concludes:  “The news of the guar- 
antee allowed knowledge of Barings’ troubles to spread beyond the 
inner circles without causing panic; indeed, anxiety lifted”  (1968, p. 
207).9 
For two decades after  1873  clearing houses and the US Treasury 
took actions that neutralized monetary disturbances so that crisis con- 
ditions did not develop. Why did similar actions in  1893 and 1907 not 
have comparable effects? No simple explanation is at hand to account 
for the occurrence of financial crisis in the United States in 1893. It is 
easier to account for the crisis in 1907. 
Two features of  the situation in  1893 that differed from earlier ex- 
perience may be noted: fears that silver advocates would succeed in 
forcing the country off gold first had to be put to rest, and only sub- 
sequently did the condition of the banks as a result of mercantile failures 
excite independent concern. At that point the clearing houses issued 
loan certificates. Sprague reports (1910, p.  173),  “Serious strain had 
been met boldly and successfully,” but that was not to be the end of 
the episode. A second wave of  distrust of banks spread over the west 
and south with consequent withdrawals of cash reserves from New 
York banks. Thereupon the Erie Railroad went into receivership and 
the stock market suffered the worst decline of the year. Bank suspen- 
sions followed in the east as well as in the south and west.  Starting 
with banks in New York, banks throughout the country partly restricted 
cash payments, sending currency to a premium. The restriction, which 
lasted from 3 August to 2 September, came six weeks after the issue 
of clearing-house  loan certificates and when gold was arriving from 
Europe. 
Why did the issue of loan certificates not cut short the episode? One 
suggestion is that some banks did not avail themselves of the oppor- 
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shrinkage of their reserves (Noyes 1894, p. 22). In addition, individual 
banks with the bulk of bankers' deposits had reserve deficiencies even 
though aggregate reserves of the banks were adequate. The suggestion 
that best conforms to the view I am presenting is that as early as July 
(Noyes 1894, p. 25) rumors of refusal of banks to convert deposits into 
cash incited the financial crisis. A misinformed public can nullify the 
beneficial effects of actions designed to avert panic. 
In 1907, the explanation for the occurrence of crisis appears straight- 
forward. Assistance to troubled trust companies was granted slowly 
and without dramatic effect. The runs on the trust companies depleted 
the currency holdings of the New York Clearing House banks which 
were also shipping currency to interior banks and paying .it out over 
their counters to their own frightened depositors. Although the Trea- 
sury helped by depositing currency with these banks, New York was 
threatened with panic, loans were obtainable only with great difficulty, 
and stock market prices collapsed.  Sprague argued that at this point 
the clearing-house banks should have issued loan certificates to enable 
banks to extend loans more freely to borrowers and also to prevent 
the weakening of particular banks with unfavourable clearing-house 
balances.  In his view, the banks did not do so due to their mistaken 
belief  that  an issue of  clearing-house  loan certificates would  cause 
restriction (Sprague, pp. 257-8,272-3).  While local runs in New York 
subsided, alarm spread throughout the country. Loss of confidence was 
displayed less by the public than by country banks. They demanded 
currency for the funds on deposit or on call in New York. Belatedly, 
the New York Clearing House issued loan certificates and immediately 
restricted  the convertibility of  deposits into currency.  Countrywide 
restriction followed. In 1907, the right actions were taken too late to 
be effective."J 
The wartime features of the 1914 episode make it not wholly com- 
parable to earlier cases of  threatened crises that were averted. Yet to 
cope with the problems that rose in the summer of  1914, some of the 
methods relied on in peacetime episodes were applied. Foremost was 
the provision of emergency currency issues, in the United States, both 
clearing-house loan certificates and Aldrich-Vreeland currency (issued 
by groups of banks under the Act of  1908 establishing the National 
Monetary Commission), and in England, Treasury Currency Notes, 
which soon displaced gold coin. Initially, in the United States, concern 
was directed to limiting shipments of gold, but that became otiose: with 
the reopening of the sterling acceptance market in London, the bellig- 
erents' growing demand for exports, and the balance of trade turning 
strongly in favor of the United States. In England, initially Bank rate 
was lifted to 10 percent, the level at which it had stood on the sus- 
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pension was needed, and Bank rate was lowered to 5 percent within 
the week to remain unchanged for the duration. 
The additional measures taken to restore the channels of international 
and domestic financial activity were basically government subsidies (to 
the export trade in the United States in the form of war risk insurance) 
or government guarantees against loss (to the banking system in En- 
gland). The guarantees in England led to the termination of an extended 
August Bank Holiday and of moratoria on the payment of bills making 
possible the renewal of availability of acceptance credits in London. 
A protracted closing of the stock markets in both New York and London 
was ultimately ended. 
Britain’s decision to suspend convertibility into gold in September 
1931, as I noted earlier,  does not  qualify as a financial crisis.  Real 
financial crises par excellence were experienced by the United States 
from 1930 to 1933. The lender-of-last-resort was responsible for a series 
of crises that intensified over time because it did not recognize  the 
need to provide liquidity to the fractional reserve banking system that 
was confronted with surges of repeated runs. A multiple contraction 
of deposits was enforced by the inability of the banks to acquire ad- 
equate amounts of high-powered money.  By  March  1933 the entire 
financial system was prostrate. 
The reasons may now be summarized, accounting for financial crises 
that did or did not occur in the past. In both cases the setting is one 
in which the financial distress of certain firms became known to market 
participants, raising alarm as creditors became concerned about the 
value of their claims not only on those firms but also firms previously 
in sound condition. Banks that were creditors of the firms in distress 
became targets of suspicion by their depositors. When monetary au- 
thorities failed to demonstrate  readiness at the beginning of  such a 
disturbance to meet all demands of  sound debtors for loans and of 
depositors for cash, a financial crisis occurred. A financial crisis per 
contra could be averted by timely predictable signals to market par- 
ticipants of institutional readiness to make available an augmented sup- 
ply of funds. The sources of the funds supplied might have been inflows 
from abroad-attracted  by higher domestic than foreign interest rates- 
or emergency issues of  domestic currency.  The readiness  was  all. 
Knowledge of the availability of the supply was sufficient to allay alarm, 
so that the funds were never drawn on. In a few instances, orderly 
liquidation of the firms in distress, with a guarantee against loss by the 
liquidator, isolated the problem so that it did not spread to other firms 
and averted a financial crisis in this way. 
A breakdown of the payments system has not occurred in the last 
century and more in England-ignoring  the 1914 episode-and  in the 
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the financial distress of the few must not be permitted to become a 
financial crisis for all. Individual debtors fail but their difficulties do 
not become widespread and undermine creditors in general. Bad banks 
fail, or more likely are reorganized under new management or merged 
with a good bank,  but if  a run on a bank occurs-it  is said to have 
occurred on the Banco Ambrosiano in the recent scandal in Italy-it 
is not permitted to cumulate into a banking panic. In the United States, 
federal deposit insurance attempts to remove the problem of a loss of 
confidence in the ability of banks to convert deposits into currency 
and thus to eliminate the reason for bank runs, but, as the experience 
of other countries proves, such insurance is not essential. Not only are 
authorities better educated. So also is the public. As its experience has 
grown with the institutional arrangements that prevent disruption of 
the payments system, its behavior contributes to the dependability of 
the system. 
11.3  Manias, Panics, Crashes 
The preceding sections have focused on the relation between financial 
distress of firms with perceived  significant market presence and the 
historical incidence of financial crises. In this section the focus shifts 
to the validity of the identification of manias with financial crises (Kin- 
dleberger 1978). 
For Kindleberger, manias, panics, and crashes are three phases of 
the same process. During manias, investors shift from money to real 
or  financial assets. During panics, they try to shift from real or  financial 
assets to money. Crashes are the denouement of the process, with the 
collapse of prices of whatever was eagerly acquired during the mania- 
“commodities,  houses, buildings, land, stocks, bonds”  (1978, p.  5). 
He takes for granted that manias occur during cyclical expansions and 
the panic phases at peaks, while disclaiming that every business ex- 
pansion leads “inevitably to mania and panic. But the pattern occurs 
sufficiently frequently and with sufficient uniformity”  (p. 5). Finally, 
he regards the manias, panics, and crashes that he discusses as financial 
crises per se. 
In current economic analysis, the word “bubble” has supplanted the 
pejorative “mania.”  In the definition proposed by Flood and Garber 
(1982, p. 275), “The possibility of  . . . a price bubble exists when the 
expected rate of market price change is an important factor determining 
current market price.”  No reference is made to cyclical conditions in 
the definition.  In my view, bubbles  may  arise independently of  the 
economy’s cyclical stage, although business expansion may foster them. 
No one has systematically examined all the cases, so the ones asso- 
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attention. Kindleberger’s assertion that, according to a monetarist view, 
“mania and panic would both be avoided if  only the supply of money 
were stabilized at some fixed quantity, or at a regular growing level” 
(pp. 5-6)  does not accord with my monetarist view. Bubbles, like bank- 
ruptcies, would occur even if the money stock were free of destabilising 
cyclical swings. The Florida land boom of 1925-6  and the gold price 
bubble of  1979-80  were created by opportunities those markets ap- 
peared to offer rather than the pattern of monetary growth. 
A basic fact concerning bubbles is that they leave eager investors in 
sure-fire, get-rich schemes at the take-off considerably poorer at the 
landing. The loss of wealth attendant on misguided, unprofitable, vol- 
untary investment decisions  is, of  course, not  confined to bubbles. 
Bankruptcy proceedings are a daily occurrence in economic life. Will- 
ingness to spend may be reduced and previously glowing expectations 
may be replaced by uncertainty. But loss of wealth is not synonymous 
with a financial crisis. 
At the stock market peak in 1929, the total value of all shares listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange was about $200 billion. The decline 
in October is estimated at nearly $15Y2 billion, so many investors un- 
doubtedly were poorer. Yet no financial crisis occurred following the 
great crash. The reason is that prompt and effective action by the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank provided additional reserves to the New 
York  banks through open market purchases.  Kindleberger acknowl- 
edges that the crash did not “lead to a money market panic . . .  or to 
runs on banks, probably  because of the effective action of the New 
York Federal Reserve in pumping funds into the market” (p. 113), but 
still classifies the crash as a financial crisis apparently because it “spread 
liquidation to other asset markets, such as commodities, and seized up 
credit to strike a hard blow at output”  (p. 113). Any deflation would 
thus qualify as a financial crisis. 
In a perceptive comment on bubbles, Wood (1983) has noted that 
they concern markets “where quantities traded have varied little, while 
there have been enormous variations in price. They are interesting, but 
the fate of nations seldom depends on them.” 
Kindleberger provides a tabulation in an appendix to his book that 
lists some three dozen financial crisis during two and a half centuries, 
characterizing each one by the subject of  the mania,  how it was  fi- 
nanced, dates of the peak and crash, and a final entry identifying the 
lender-of-last-resort.  It is the final entry that motivates Kindleberger’s 
study. He argues the importance of a lender-of-last-resort “who comes 
to the rescue and provides the public good of stability that the private 
market is unable to produce for itself”  (p. 4).”  Yet he does not dis- 
criminate between episodes in which successful action was taken to 
prevent the development of a crisis and episodes in which no action 
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Despite his designation of  all episodes as financial crises without 
differentiation of  those where the “rescue”  provided stability, even 
Kindleberger notes that there has been a dwindling of the number and 
a lessening of  the severity of domestic financial crises since 1866 in 
Britain and since 1929 in the United States and on the Continent. He 
considers three possible explanations: (i) the decline of  usury laws, 
making it possible for interest rates to be raised sufficiently to limit 
manias; (ii) the shunning of  manias by markets that had learned from 
experience; (iii) the calming of anxieties owing to the known existence 
of a lender-of-last-resort. He dismisses the first two out of  hand, but 
his position on the third is ambiguous. Nor is it clear why at this point 
he cites Minsky’s reference (1977) to “near panics” in 1966, 1969-70, 
and 1974-5,  and “incipient crises” in  1974 (p. 218). 
The record on domestic financial crises may thus be reassuring to 
Kindleberger, but his current concern is the greater frequency now 
than in the nineteenth century of foreign exchange crises. The solution 
he suggests is an international lender-of-last resort.  l3 The recent ana- 
lytical literature on bubbles also encompasses runs on a currency that 
is fixed in price in terms of at least one other currency and runs under 
flexible exchange rates (Flood and Garber 1982). The underlying as- 
sumption that a run on a currency is a crisis seems to me untenable. 
The market will sell off an overvalued currency under fixed or floating 
exchange rates and will shift to an undervalued currency. If authorities 
resist the market’s evaluation, it may be costly for them, but the prob- 
lem facing the currency is more fundamental: the economic policies 
that are responsible for the currency’s plight are the heart of the matter. 
If there is a crisis, it resides in the failure to adjust those policies. 
I conclude that manias, panics, and crashes reduce wealth. They are 
not per se financial crises unless the shift from tangible or financial 
assets to money leads to a run on banks. A lender-of-last-resort can 
forestall such a development, so I agree with Kindleberger that there 
is an important role for such an entity, although I do not subscribe to 
the notion that only a public authority has in the past filled or can at 
present fill that role. 
11.4  Financial Distress versus Financial Crises 
In my lexicon, the events since the mid-1960s that have been termed 
“financial crises” or “threats of a financial crisis” have been pseudo- 
financial crises. Essentially the response to each of these events (to be 
noted  in  what follows) has been  a form of  bail-out, for which  the 
justification was that the action averted crisis. Since no financial crisis 
would in fact have been experienced had a bail-out not been under- 
taken, the events were pseudo-financial crises. Moreover, the policies 
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The first event to be considered here was the failure of the Penn 
Central Railroad in June 1970. The Federal Reserve was concerned lest 
the company’s default on its $200 million commercial paper borrowings 
would jeopardize  that market. The Fed assumed that lenders would 
not discriminate between a troubled issuer and other perfectly sound 
issuers. The scenario envisaged by the Fed was that the latter would 
need to pay off their commercial paper because of generalized distrust 
of the instrument. Accordingly, the banks were informed that the dis- 
count window was  “wide open”  (Maisel 1973, p.  9) if  they needed 
funds to make loans to customers unable to roll over commercial paper. 
In addition, to enable banks to bid freely for funds in the open market, 
the Fed suspended interest rate ceilings on 30 to 89-day large denom- 
ination certificates of deposit-an  action that was desirable in its own 
right. Maisel concludes that the Fed’s actions averted a panic (p. 4). 
However, if there were commercial paper issuers that faced difficulties, 
as Carron notes (1982, p. 398), it was not owing to the condition of the 
market as such but to “conditions peculiar to those firms” (Chrysler 
Financial and Commercial Credit among others). The verdict of the 
1971 Economic Report of the President  (p. 69) was that no “genuine 
liquidity crisis existed in mid-1970.” 
Events in 1973-4  centred on bank failures in the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, the United States, and Switzerland that were thought 
to threaten the international financial order. Hirsch (1977, p. 248), who 
believes that cooperation to achieve “collective  intermediate goods’’ 
of bank  stability is technically easier to organize in a small group of 
like minded individuals and institutions than in an open group”  (p. 
249)-a  view reminiscent of de Cecco’sAescribes what happened in 
Britain when “fringe banks,”  bank new-comers, experienced difficul- 
ties in December  1973. A deterioration of  the market value of real 
estate investments of these banks led to deposit withdrawals and the 
switching of new deposits to established banks. To  save depositors of 
the fringe banks from losses, the four-member  oligopoly of  deposit 
banks had to commit resources to that end. Hirsch interprets the action 
taken by the established banks as in their self-interest by removing a 
source of competition. Whatever the motivation of the established banks, 
their collective  action bespeaks an understanding that the failure of 
individual banks must not be allowed to contract the aggregate money 
stock. 
Two views have been presented with respect to the actions taken by 
the Federal Reserve when Franklin National Bank announced, in May 
1974, that it had  lost heavily in forward transactions  in the foreign 
exchange market. The Federal Reserve initially announced that it would 
advance whatever funds Franklin needed, so long as it remained sol- 
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October. At that point the bank was merged with another institution 
and the FDIC assumed the Federal Reserve’s loan. 
One view (Carron 1982, p. 400) is that the preconditions of a genuine 
financial crisis existed, as evidenced by the fact that corporations paid 
premiums  on their borrowings  that  reflected  risks perceived  in  the 
banking system rather than in their own positions. The preconditions 
were, however, mitigated both because markets remained orderly with 
no lack of confidence on the part of investors and the central bank 
intervened effectively. An opposite view is that the immediate impact 
of Franklin’s failure was erased by a Federal Reserve bail-out that led 
market participants to believe that no bank failures would be tolerated 
and that encouraged ‘banks to become more reckless than ever’ (Wojni- 
lower 1980, pp. 298-9).  It was not only the losses in the foreign ex- 
change market that the Franklin case revealed. The aftermath of  its 
failure also disclosed the near-bankruptcy of real estate affiliates many 
banks owned. The affiliates had financed construction with short-term 
funds and invested in real estate and mortgages whose value declined 
when interest rates rose. Selling off real estate at distress prices further 
compromised  the position of the affiliates, so that they experienced 
problems in selling their paper. 
The perception of increased risk in lending to banks raised the cost 
of funds for them. Does this justify a bail-out or concern that a financial 
crisis was imminent? 
Banking difficulties in Europe in 1974 that arose because of losses 
sustained in the foreign exchange market were apparently met without 
bail-outs. The Bundesbank announced the liquidation of Bankhaus I.D. 
Herstatt. Neither Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentral of West Ger- 
many nor Union Bank of Switzerland was mortally  wounded by its 
losses. 
It was not banking difficulties but financial distress of two large real 
sector firms-Lockheed  Corporation (197 1) and Chrysler Corporation 
(1979Gand a municipality-New  York City (1975tthat  also provided 
occasions for a prognosis of a threat of financial crisis. In each case 
federal government legislation was enacted to guarantee private loans 
to these entities. The object was to avoid bankruptcy.  Though Penn 
Central Railroad  had filed for bankruptcy and subsequently restruc- 
tured its operations to become an efficient firm, the view that has since 
come to prevail is that bankruptcy  proceedings  by  themselves will 
create a financial crisis. The loan guarantees thus serve to mask the 
inefficient use of  resources that had produced financial distress. It is 
true that some restructuring of claims on and operations of the entities 
was required as a condition of the guarantees, but it is not clear why 
reorganisation under bankruptcy proceedings would have precipitated 
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markets cannot discriminate between a firm or municipality in financial 
distress and others in sound condition. The inefficient are sustained in 
their misuse of resources because of the imagined hardship that would 
be imposed on the efficient. 
Another class of events that is said to raise the prospect of domestic 
financial crisis is still impending-the  impairment of the ability of many 
sovereign countries to make scheduled payments on their outstanding 
bank loans. Short-term loans extended to governments and to private 
borrowers abroad in some cases appear to be beyond their prospective 
capacity to repay. Acknowledgement of  default on outstanding loans 
would require write-downs that would reduce capital of the banks in- 
volved and that would undoubtedly raise the cost to them of funds 
obtained in the open market. This course has been rejected on the 
ground that confidence in the stability of the banking system would be 
shaken. The alternative chosen has been the subterfuge that all the 
loans will be repaid, with the banks exhorted to provide an increase 
in lending sufficient to enable delinquent borrowers to maintain interest 
payments and to reschedule principal. In addition, the goal of  stable 
non-inflationary monetary growth has been sacrificed as part of  the 
effort to resolve the international debt problem. It is taken for granted 
that, if the policy of papering over the true economic prospects of the 
borrowing countries ultimately fails, standing in the wings will be the 
authorities ready to bail out the lenders. The costs of renewed inflation 
will then be dismissed as an unfortunate side effect. 
Real financial crises need not occur because there is a well-understood 
solution to the problem: assure that deposits can be converted at will 
into currency whatever the difficulties banks encounter. The solution 
does not preclude failure of  mismanaged banks. Recent discussion of 
moral hazard in relation to real financial crises would be more apt in 
relation to pseudo-financial crises. They provide the rationale for bail- 
outs and shoring up inefficiency. Pseudo-financial  crises in recent years 
have generated expectations “that no monetary authority will  allow 
any key financial actor to fail”  (Wojnilower 1980,  p.  299). Political 
authority seems well embarked in the direction of not allowing any key 
non-financial actor to fail, and of encouraging inflationary actions by 
domestic monetary authorities and international agencies in the cause 
of  pseudo-financial crises. 
Notes 
1. The example of the deflation in 1920- 1 in the United States may be cited. 
Bank reserves declined from $2.8 billion in April 1920 to $2.4 billion in August 
1921. Wholesale prices (on  the base 1926) fell from a peak of  167 in May 1920 287  Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises 
to a trough of 91 January 1922. An index of liabilities of business failures rose 
from a trough of 6.0 in January 1920 to a peak of 71.2 in February 1922. Although 
506 banks suspended business in 1921, there was no financial crisis. The deposit- 
currency and the deposit-reserve  ratios in August  1921 were higher than in 
April 1920. 
2.  Financial distress defines the condition of an individual, a non-financial 
firm or an individual bank, or an industry that has assets with realisable value 
in money that is less than the amount of its indebtedness. 
3. De Cecco (1975) argues that no problem would have arisen, had not the 
joint  stock banks arbitrarily  begun  a credit squeeze in  the middle  of  July, 
recalling loans they had made to bill brokers, and refusing to finance foreign 
clients of the accepting houses who usually borrowed in London to meet their 
maturing bills that the London houses had accepted.  Stock Exchange dealers 
who worked on loans from foreign banks dumped their stocks to be able to 
return borrowed  money,  compelling the joint  stock  banks to call for extra 
margin from customers with Lombard loans, since the value of the collateral 
had declined. De Cecco says that the banks assumed a crisis of confidence on 
the part of the public would occur but in fact it did not happen. Therefore the 
banks engineered a crisis of confidence by refusing to pay out gold to the public 
and themselves  drawing on the Bank’s gold.  The motive for the banks’ be- 
haviour,  according to de Cecco, was to “substitute themselves  in lucrative 
international business” and “exclude traditional intermediaries from their func- 
tions,”  though they wanted only “to threaten them with the possibility of. . . 
death, in order to have them rescued  in  extremis and to paralyze their future 
action” (p. 149). 
According to Sayers (I, p. 70), it was sales of internationally traded securities 
on European stock exchanges that initiated the credit squeeze in London. He 
also notes that the joint stock banks’ refusal to pay out gold before the August 
Bank  Holiday  may  be interpreted  in a more favorable light than  de Cecco 
presents (I, p. 72). 
4. De Cecco (1975, pp. 80-2)  dismisses Bagehot’s analysis. According to de 
Cecco, the Bank deliberately sought the fall of Overend, Gurney because “they 
were encroaching upon the very branch of business on which the Bank throve: 
the discounting of bills from all over the country. . . . So conflict between the 
two giants seemed inevitable, particularly as their business had become very 
similar in nature”  (p. 80). “The  Bank watched  its rival fall without making 
any attempt to come to its rescue; on  the contrary, it implemented a six-month 
‘dear money’ policy specifically to make Gurney’s fall inevitable. Only after 
its rival had gone under did the Bank go to the market’s rescue by extending 
unlimited  assistance to anybody  needing  it, to allay  the panic  induced  by 
Gurney’s failure”  (p. 82). 
If de Cecco is right, the Bank was culpable because it deliberately ignored 
“what was well understood.”  But the evidence does not support de Cecco’s 
opinion that by 1866 the Bank understood what needed to be done in a timely 
way to prevent a crisis. 
5. In Austria, in 1873, the main response to the stock market decline which 
was  followed  by  a large number  of insolvencies  and bankruptcies  was the 
suspension of the Banking Act of  1862 to ‘‘assist the mobilization of central 
bank funds in case a liquidity shortage should make itself felt” (Marz 1982, p. 
188). No shortage occurred. Six months later, a consortium of banking houses 
and the central bank rescued from collapse the Bodencredit-Anstalt, an issuer 
of mortgage bonds with credit standing abroad equal to that of Austrian treasury 
certificates. The firm had been involved in “risky stock-exchange operations” 
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6. The Economist 5 October 1878 (Gregory 1929,II, pp. 289-90),  commented 
on the bank’s failure: “There was no run, or any semblance of run; there was 
no local discredit.  . . . The fact that the other Scottish banks are willing to 
take up the notes of the City of Glasgow Banks appears to support the belief 
that all the liabilities of the bank will be met in full. The danger of discrediting 
the circulation may, however, have had some influence on the other banks in 
determining their action in this matter.” 
7.  Presnell  (1982, p.  152) reports the actions taken in  Ceylon,  when the 
Oriental Banking Corporation, a major international bank with many branches 
in Southeast Asia and in Australia, collapsed in May 1884. The colony’s gov- 
ernor guaranteed  the bank’s  substantial note issues and the other banks im- 
ported silver rupees from India. A financial crisis was averted. 
8. A similar device had apparently been used by the Bank of France in 1889. 
Presnell(l968, p. 205) cites a French historian as crediting France with helping 
England in “two ways in  1890: with gold and by her example.”  The example 
refers to the use of a collective guarantee by French banks in support of the 
Bank of France. A certain Comptoir d’Escompte, in 1889, experienced a run 
as the result  of  unwise loans it had  made to a company  that speculated  in 
copper. The Bank provided the Comptoir with funds to reimburse its depositors 
and creditors and then liquidated it. 
9. According to de Cecco (1975, p. 92), because of the Bank of England’s 
rivalry with the joint stock banks, only merchant bankers were first asked to 
underwrite the guarantee, and the joint stock banks only later. He concludes 
that the Baring crisis “proved  to be the swan song of the power of the Bank 
of  England  and of the merchant  banks.  Barings were prevented  from going 
down and taking other houses with them; but this was made possible only by 
a series of expedients-all  traditional instruments  of policy  had been  aban- 
doned” (p. 95). 
Presnell deplores the device of the guarantee as “not central banking,”  as 
well as loss of the opportunity the Barings’ situation created to advance reform 
of the Act of 1844, and more particularly the need for larger banking and larger 
gold reserves. 
10. Bonelli’s article (1982, pp. 51-65)  on “The 1907 Financial Crisis in Italy” 
should be retitled  “The  1907 Financial Crisis That Did Not Occur in Italy.” 
He defines the crisis as a prolonged  decline in prices of shares that brought 
one of the largest mixed banks close to suspension. It did not happen because 
the Banca d’Italia, the largest of  the three issuing banks, initiated  and coor- 
dinated  “anticrisis  measures”  (p.  51).  “It  began  to provide  liquidity  in all 
directions by means of discounts and advances . . . it also announced that its 
reserves were increasing, that it could issue money without any difficulty, and 
that it could even count on the government’s readiness to take any extraor- 
dinary measures that might become necessary  (to wit, removal of the ceiling 
established by law as regards the volume of circulation not enjoying full metallic 
coverage)”  (p. 58). 
11. Kindleberger cites no evidence in  support of the proposition  that the 
private market is unable to serve as the lender-of-the-last-resort.  The clearing 
houses at times undertook that function under the National Banking System 
in the United States. 
12. An oddity is that the tabulation includes an entry for 1819 in England. 
The listing for that episode  is  “none”  under “crisis,”  and  “none  needed” 
under “lender-of-last-resort.” 
13. I share the view expressed by Griffiths (1983) that the proposal should 
be rejected. The grounds for rejection that he cites relate to the role of banks 
and international debt. They also apply to foreign exchange markets. 